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ABSTRACT 
Forensic and Anti-Forensic Techniques for Object Linking and  
Embedding 2 (OLE2)-Formatted Documents 
 
 
by 
 
Jason Daniels, Master of Science 
 
Utah State University, 2008 
 
Major Professor: Dr. Robert F. Erbacher 
Department: Computer Science 
 
 
Common office documents provide significant opportunity for forensic and anti-
forensic work.  The Object Linking and Embedding 2 (OLE2) specification used 
primarily by Microsoft’s Office Suite contains unused or dead space regions that can be 
overwritten to hide covert channels of communication.  This thesis describes a technique 
to detect those covert channels and also describes a different method of encoding that 
lowers the probability of detection.  
The algorithm developed, called OleDetection, is based on the use of kurtosis and 
byte frequency distribution statistics to accurately identify OLE2 documents with covert 
channels.  OleDetection is able to correctly identify 99.97 percent of documents with 
covert channel and only a false positive rate OF 0.65 percent.   
The improved encoding scheme encodes the covert channel with patterns found in 
unmodified dead space regions.  This anti-forensic technique allows the covert channel to 
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masquerade as normal data, lowering the probability that any detection tool is able to 
detect its presence. 
(132 pages) 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Forensic Computing 
Stated simply, forensic computing is the science of collecting, discovering, and 
preserving digital data for use in court or in the protection of businesses, public entities, 
and private individuals.  Put differently, “…computer forensics is considered to be the use 
of analytical and investigative techniques to identify, collect, examine and preserve 
evidence/information which is magnetically stored or encoded” [7:1]. 
 Forensic computing is a multi-discipline science in which computer science joins 
forces with information systems, law enforcement, the legal community, and social 
science [2].  In addition, businesses, the military, academics, and individuals use forensic 
computing for their own purposes [2].  The forensic computing community has defined 
several models with which to handle digital devices involved in an investigation. 
Generally the approach is as follows [2, 21]:  
1. Identification 
2. Preparation 
3. Approach of strategy 
4. Preservation 
5. Collection 
6. Examination 
7. Analysis 
8. Presentation 
9. Return of evidence 
 
 The overarching goal is to provide evidence proving the innocence or guilt of a 
party.  A large part played by the computer science discipline, however, is the 
development of tools that enable investigators to examine and analyze (steps 6 and 7) the 
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collected data.   Computer forensics specializes in finding digital data to assist in an 
investigation.  However, this is not an easy task. Creating steganographic techniques, 
performing encryption, and the large amount of disk space that needs to be searched are 
by no means trivial tasks. In fact, much research has been done around the detection of 
stenographic algorithms and finding hidden data files in large disk spaces [9, 12, 14, 19, 
26]. 
1.2  Anti-Forensics 
Anti-forensics is the science of avoiding the detection of incriminating data either 
by destroying it entirely or hiding it from an investigator.  Anti-forensic techniques can 
be broken into four different categories: destroying evidence, hiding information, 
elimination of sources, and counterfeiting evidence [13, 22].   
The destruction of evidence can be either a physical or logical destruction. While 
the preferred method is to use a grinder on the hard drive platters, physical destruction 
may also include other methods, such as using a magnet to destroy a hard drive. 
Whatever the method of choice, the result is the same: making retrieval of information 
impossible.  Logical destruction wherein the incriminating bytes are overwritten with 
random bytes is also a highly effective means of making data retrieval impossible.  When 
the data is destroyed, forensic attempts to collect the evidence is obviously hampered. 
Hiding evidence of foul play or other data is applicable for hacked servers or data 
on a local computer.  Techniques used to hide the presence of a hacked machine include 
modifying logs, applications, runtime-libraries or even the operating system itself, 
preventing incriminating evidence to be returned, and thus making the system appear as if 
3 
 
it had never been compromised [5].  Additional anti-forensic methods conceal the 
existence of illegal data on a local machine owned by a criminal.  Most of these methods 
covertly hide data in non-portable ways directly on the hard drive.  These include the use 
of slack space between partitions, using the hidden protected area (HPA) sector, the 
creation of bad sectors on the hard drive and the storage of data on those sectors, or even 
the creation of second hidden OS [1].   
Portable digital documents can also be used to hide the presence of data via 
encryption, masquerading, or steganography.   Encryption shows the existence of data, 
but if done properly, encryption can prevent the actual data from ever being recovered.   
Files masquerading as other documents can be achieved as simply as changing the 
extension of the file (e.g. jpg to txt), or more sophisticated schemes can be employed to 
place the data in other documents, append it to the end of an executable [9].  
Steganography or the hiding of data in some cover medium creates a stego medium that 
on cursory inspection will appear to have not been tampered with or to have anything 
notably wrong about the file – despite the hidden data [23].  The locations and ways data 
is hidden inside other media is called a covert channels and has a defined maximum 
hiding capacity [18]. 
The elimination of sources can be simply the fact that data is never recorded – 
digitally or otherwise.  The counterfeiting of evidence is the modification of the files to 
incriminate someone besides the defendant. Examples of this may include simply the 
recording of misleading information or the modification of files (e.g., modifying the last 
modified date, or changing the metadata in a Word document) 
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1.3  Forensic Computing with OLE2 
Documents 
Programmatic features of an application can assist in forensic computing. An 
example may include an application maintaining meta-data on a document or tracking 
how a document changes.  This meta-data or change tracking can contain specific 
information about the creator of the document, track when and by whom it is updated, 
and even track the actual changes that were made.  A prime example is the use of the 
tracking feature. Many companies and individuals have been put in the hot seat when the 
tracked changes were brought to light [11, 31].   
Most of the undesired outcomes from the use of this meta-data have been passive 
in their creation and usually have resulted from a misunderstanding of the features of the 
applications by users.  However, there are other users that aggressively manipulate 
documents to hide information and use said documents to covertly communicate sensitive 
information without being detected by authorities.  Recently, a new technique for 
implementing data hiding was developed that finds slack or unused space in the 
document and then encodes a covert channel of hidden data without any visual indication 
the file has been tampered with.  This technique was developed for the Microsoft OLE2 
format, which is used in Microsoft (MS) Word, MS Excel, and MS PowerPoint 
documents [6]. 
This new data hiding technique provides a big problem for investigators and 
employers.   Employees or criminals may prevent an investigator or employer from 
discovering covert plans, shared industrial secrets, or other illegal activity by simply 
hiding information in a common document format used on most computers.  An 
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employee could send confidential information out of the company and leave no clue of 
the illegal activity.  Although there are no visual clues of data being hidden, there still 
exist telltale signs that can be used to potentially detect the modified documents. 
This thesis a) presents a statistical-based detection tool to find the presence of 
covert channels in OLE2-formatted documents and b) introduces an improved method of 
encoding covert channels that lowers the probability of detecting hidden data. 
A guide to the rest of this thesis: Chapter 2 reviews related works, Chapters 3, 4, 
and 5 review the OLE2 format and statistical properties.  Chapter 6 focuses on an anti-
forensic technique for improving data hiding.  Chapter 7 reviews the forensic computing 
experiments and results of detecting hidden data.  Chapters 8 and 9 present future works 
and the conclusion.  
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CHAPTER 2 
RELATED WORK 
Information hiding occurs in various digital mediums: file systems, networking 
protocols, and digital documents.  There is a large body of research and development that 
exploits the ability to hide information in images [29], audio files [32], executables [8], 
and movie files [30].  However, comparatively little work has been done regarding hiding 
data in common office documents.    
Cantrell et al. [4] and Byers [3] explored the ability to hide information in MS 
Office documents and found ways to hide information in the metadata sections of the 
documents.  This method works, but is easily detected. Research in this area points out 
that large sections of documents are uniformly 0x00 or 0xFF, however; any time those 
sections are exploited, the document becomes corrupt and cannot be reopened in the 
native MS Office application.  Contrell et al. [4] specifically point out that nearly all 
types of documents are vulnerable to inserting data past the end of the EOF marker, in 
which case the documents can still be reopened.   
Tsung-Yuan et al. [17] introduce a steganographic method of hiding data in 
Microsoft documents by using the tracking mechanism available in Microsoft Word.  
Using a synonym dictionary with the track changes feature, one is able to make the 
document appear as though it had simply been through several editorial revisions when in 
reality, the tracked changes are hidden data. 
A paper by Castiglione et al. [6] presents StegOlè, a method of hiding data in the 
unused sectors of the Microsoft compound document file format, otherwise known as the 
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OLE2 Compound Format.  This methodology is based on the fact that the document 
format uses fixed 64- and 512-byte sector sizes, some of which are left in unused sections 
of the document.  Using the file’s index or section allocation table (SAT), unused sectors 
are identified and overwritten without negatively impacting the visual or functional 
aspect of the document.  After the cover document is modified into a stego-document, the 
file may continue to be the same size and can be opened by the native application.  A 
combination of compression, AES encryption, and an SHA-1 hash are used in 
combination to maximize space, secrecy, and message verification on extraction 
Existing detection tools concentrate on finding hidden information on file systems 
[10], images [12], video files [28], executables [15], databases [20], and networks [27].  
Currently, there are no known techniques for detecting covert channels in common office 
documents.   
At the time of the original literature search for this thesis, December 2006 and 
January 2007, only a minimal amount of research had been published on creating covert 
channels in OLE2 formatted documents.   In fact, Cantrell et al. [4] and Byers [3] were 
the only known articles hiding data in MS Office documents.    However, the work in [3 
and 4] resulted in corrupt files native applications could not open.   Shortly after doing 
reviewing the literature, I started developing of a data-hiding tool for OLE documents, 
and eventually I successfully implemented a data-hiding scheme.  The developed 
algorithm is able to encrypt and embed, and then extract and decrypt any message into an 
OLE2-formatted document.   The modified document file size is not modified nor is the 
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look of the document impacted; furthermore the document’s integrity is not 
compromised, allowing the file to be opened by its native application.   
In September 2007, I looked for additional research articles and found [6] by 
Castiglione.  The article introduced StegOlè, which implements essentially the same 
algorithm I had developed.  There are some minor feature differences between the two 
implementations, but the core idea of finding and overwriting unused sectors is identical.  
Even though both methods were developed independently of each other, because StegOlè 
was developed and published first, this work uses it as the reference implementation.  
Specifically, StegOlè adds covert channels for testing my detection tool and provides a 
base from which to lower the detection rate of my encoding even further. 
 The work for this thesis goes beyond the work done by StegOlè.  In the current 
work, I develop and implement a detection tool for finding any OLE2 document 
containing a covert channel.  The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. After 
showing how the covert channels are detected, I propose new encoding techniques that do 
a better job of lowering the detection rate. Chapters 3 through 5 provide a review of the 
used statistical methods and the OLE2 format. Chapters 6 and 7 discuss the details and 
results of the detection tool and encoding schemes. Chapter 8 presents future work in this 
area.  Finally, Chapter 9 gives the conclusion. 
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CHAPTER 3 
COVERT CHANNELS IN OLE2-FORMATTED DOCUMENTS 
This thesis focuses on the detecting data hidden in unused portions of the OLE2 
format and improving that method to decrease the ability to detect the covert channel.  
The following sections introduce the StegOlè algorithm, the stegomedia detection, and 
my proposed modification to the StegOlè algorithm to decrease its detectability. 
Microsoft Office Suite uses the Object Linking and Embedding 2 (OLE2) as its 
Compound Document format.  The power of this format is the ability to contain multiple 
document types within a single file, allowing a single application to embed the contents 
of different applications.   The format is entirely structured around the idea of sectors and 
streams.  An OLE2 document has multiple streams representing the different objects 
embedded in the document.  Each stream, and the file as a whole, is partitioned into 512- 
byte sectors. In other words, regardless of the actual data size, the file size is always a 
factor of 512.  
A master table identifies each of the streams and the starting sector.  To manage 
which sector belongs to which stream, a summary information stream maintains a block 
allocation table (BAT).   This BAT is essentially an array of 4-byte integers that represent 
each sector in the document.   Often, a block is unused and is identified with a -1; other 
valid entries maintain a linked list of sectors.  Basically, each entry contains the next 
sector number in the stream.  The terminating sector can be identified by the -2 as the 
value of the entry in the BAT.  
10 
 
Creating covert channels in the OLE2 format takes advantage of properties of this 
format: the fix sector size and the unused sectors.   Often, a particular stream does not 
terminate on exactly the 512 byte boundary. In such cases, the space between the end of 
the stream and the sector can safely be overwritten.   When a sector is discovered as 
unused, it is also considered as dead space in the BAT, and that particular sector can be 
entirely overwritten with no fear of overwriting valid data.  
11 
 
CHAPTER 4 
A STATISTICAL APPROACH TO DETECTING COVERT CHANNELS  
4.1 Statistical Methods for Identifying 
Unknown Files 
 Research has shown how unknown files can be identified using statistical 
analysis.  Using byte frequency analysis and byte frequency correlation combined with 
file header/trailer techniques, McDaniel et al. achieved a 95.6 percent detection rate [16].  
Kolter et al. provide a method of detecting unknown malicious code in executables using 
machine learning with boosted decision trees.  By using 500 n-grams or data points from 
the byte code, Kolter et al. were able to gain a 98 percent detection rate and a 0.5 percent 
false positive detection rate [15].  Karresand et al. showed the use of a byte frequency 
distribution of a sliding and its derivative to be effective in uniquely identifying different 
types of documents [14].  Erbacher et al. showed that data types contained within a file 
can be potentially identified using kurtosis, byte averages, standard deviations, and 
standard deviation averages [9].  The current work builds on previous work using 
statistical analysis to identify covert channels inserted into OLE2 formatted documents. 
4.2 Detecting Covert Channels  
The manner in which StegOlè hides data and the format of OLE2 documents 
allows for a unique approach for detection.   The covert channel is not actually encoded 
as part of the existing data; rather, it is hidden in unused portions of the document.  This 
method of hiding data coupled with the fact that OLE2-formatted documents are 
guaranteed to be split into 512 sections byte allows the use of sliding window statistical 
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analysis to locate any stegomedia.  Based on previous research, at the start of this project, 
my expectation was that a statistical analysis would be able to correctly identify files 
modified to hide data.  I used two statistical analysis techniques to analyze each window, 
viz., byte frequency distribution (BFD) [14] and kurtosis [9], both of which have been 
used successfully in file type identification.  I identified and chose these particular 
measurements based on the work and analysis done by Kerrasand [14] and Erbacher [9]. 
As is demonstrated in this thesis, choosing these methods was an apt decision.     
4.3 Kurtosis 
Often used to identify unknown data, kurtosis is a statistical algorithm used to 
show the peakedness of a set of data.  Higher kurtosis values indicate large swings in the 
data’s values, as opposed to more consistent data which have lower kurtosis values.  Used 
by Erbacher in 2007 [9] to efficiently detect file types, it is calculated by multiplying the 
number of elements in the data set by the sum of the difference between the average 
value taken to the 4th power.  This total is divided by the square of the sum of the 
difference between the average value and each element take to the 2nd power. 
 
            
(1)
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4.4 Byte Frequency Distribution 
The second statistic used to detect the existence of convert channels is the byte 
frequency distribution (BFD).  First presented by Karresand et al. in 2006, the BFD is a 
method of creating a unique numerical representation of a distribution of a set of bytes 
[14].  This statistic is exactly what is says it is, a distribution of the number of times each 
byte value is encountered in a set of data. The result is a distribution with 28 or 256 
entries, the maximum value for a byte.  Averaging multiple distributions of the same type 
of data creates a mean distribution and corresponding standard deviation distribution.  
The combination of the distribution of mean values and standard deviations define what 
is called a centroid, or a fingerprint of sorts that is theoretically unique for that particular 
type of data.  
Given a centroid and any particular BFD, just how closely the two are related can 
be calculated by determining the distance between the two with a quadratic formula. The 
quadratic formula in essence is the sum of distances between each byte value count, 
weighted by the standard deviation.  Hence, the more consistent the data (lower standard 
deviation) the more weight that particular value will weigh into the measurement.   In 
more detail, the difference is taken between the window byte count (si) and the mean of 
the Centroid (ci).  The difference is squared and divided by the corresponding standard 
deviation (sigmai).  A smoothing factor (alpha) is added to the standard deviation to avoid 
division by 0 errors.  The resulting value is then summed up with the distances for each 
value in the distribution.    
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(2)
 
 
4.5 Summary 
I use these statistical algorithms together on each sliding window to create a 
unique numerical representation of the data.  Called WindowPrints, these representations 
are similar to fingerprints in that they have multiple points of reference for determining 
uniqueness.   Comparing the distance between the pre-calculated WindowPrints for 
StegOlè data with those from other documents being analyzed determines if the said 
documents contain covert channels.  
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CHAPTER 5 
STATISTICAL PROPERTIES OF OLE2-FORMATTED DOCUMENTS 
5.1 The Data Set 
As stated earlier, OLE2 specifies a compound document format that allows a 
single file to contain many other files, such as images, data, sound, etc.  The common 
office documents created by the Microsoft Office, e.g., Word, Excel, PowerPoint, are 
implementations of this specification.  Because the principals and techniques identified 
here are applicable across the board to all documents that use the specification, the data 
used for experiments and analysis here come primarily from MS Word documents.  In 
addition, I collected representative datasets for Excel and PowerPoint documents for a 
smaller set of experiments. 
 Each set of documents gathered for these experiments was randomly collected 
from various websites and varies in size and content.  I collected a total of 293 MS Word 
documents, ranging in size from 20.5 kilobytes to 4,858 kilobytes.  The contents of the 
documents range from primarily text to forms with several tables, while others contain 
images of various sizes.  To determine the impact caused by specific data, two additional 
Word documents were created and tested separately from the larger dataset, one 
containing only images and one with only embedded OLE objects.  The PowerPoint 
dataset contains 99 documents ranging in content and size from 26.5 to 31,148 kilobytes.  
The Excel data set contains 109 files ranging in size from 10.0 to 8,108 kilobytes. 
5.2 The Payload 
 StegOlè requires the hidden message be entered as text from the command line, 
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because of this limitation all the experimentation done with text data (see Figure 1).   The 
algorithm can easily be modified to encode other types of data, Table 1 shows that after 
encryption, these other types of data also share very similar kurtosis and BFD properties.  
The kurtosis value vary from the text value be less the 0.63 percent and the BFD distance 
only differs by less the 1.45 percent.  These results show that as long is encryption is 
being used, the experiments and results explained are agnostic to the type of data being 
hidden. 
5.3 Experiments with the Kurtosis 
Statistic 
 To begin, let us do an overview of the kurtosis values found in an OLE2 
document and how they change when the documented are modified by StegOlè.  Based 
on the OLE2 specification to use 512-byte blocks, a 512-byte sliding window is applied 
to both an  
 
 
Figure 1. Sample of payload data used in experiments 
 
Table 1.  Kurtosis and BFD Comparisons with Different Data 
Average 
Kurtosis
Percent 
Difference 
from Text 
Data
Average BFD 
Distance
Percent 
Difference 
from Text 
Data
Text  Data 1.803 -- 468.580 --
Bitmap Data 1.795 0.45% 473.912 1.14%
JPG Data 1.813 0.53% 475.380 1.45%
MP3 Data 1.792 0.63% 466.849 0.37%
 
2   Byte Payload:   ‘:)’ 
16  Byte Payload:   ‘16_This paper is’ 
32  Byte Payload:   ‘32_This paper is intended to exp’ 
64  Byte Payload:   ‘64_This paper is intended to explain the configuration and usage’ 
128 Byte Payload:   ‘128_This paper is intended to explain the configuration and usage  
                     of the Log Miner featureThis paper is intended to explain the ‘ 
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unmodified Word document and then the same document after it has been modified by  
StegOlè to contain hidden data.  The kurtosis value is calculated for each window and 
mapped next to each other.  When comparing the two side by side, differences in the 
kurtosis indicate sectors containing hidden data.   
 
Table 2 illustrates this. The highlighted sections wherein the kurtosis differ are those 
sections that have been modified to create the covert channel, in other words to contain 
the hidden data. 
 The highlighted windows, 80, 120, and 129, indicate hidden data.  Further 
analysis shows that if the entire 512 bytes are overwritten, the kurtosis value will be on  
 
Table 2. Kurtosis Values for Original and Modified Document with 512-byte Sliding 
Window. 
Window 
Count 
Original 
Document 
Tampered 
Document Difference 
77 8.313 8.313 0.000 
78 3.138 3.138 0.000 
79 8.798 8.798 0.000 
80 24.975 1.852 -23.123 
81 4.450 4.450 0.000 
82 7.885 7.885 0.000 
83 0.000 0.000 0.000 
…. … … … 
118 6.281 6.281 0.000 
119 26.315 26.315 0.000 
120 4.692 2.119 -2.573 
121 3.220 3.220 0.000 
122 3.722 3.722 0.000 
123 4.445 4.445 0.000 
124 6.360 6.360 0.000 
125 4.496 4.496 0.000 
126 6.017 6.017 0.000 
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127 7.692 7.692 0.000 
128 10.197 10.197 0.000 
129 11.566 9.527 -2.040 
130 2.668 2.668 0.000 
average 1.804 with a standard deviation of 0.039.   The windows with different kurtosis 
values do not land within the expected range (e.g. window 129).  Instead, they are only 
partially overwritten with hidden data.   This is confirmed when the kurtosis value is 
calculated with a 64-byte sliding window.  The comparison of the unmodified and 
modified documents illustrate how only 64 bytes of the 512 bytes are overwritten with 
hidden data.  For example, window number 129 in Table 2 has a kurtosis value of 9.527, 
which is different from the original document but still outside the expected range. 
 
5.4 Experiments with Byte Frequency 
Properties  
 The byte frequency distribution is a good mechanism for viewing a profile of the 
data contained in a document.  The real usefulness of the BFD is when centroids [14] are 
created with specific data.  Using the BFD distance calculation, one can determine how 
closely other sections of data may or may not be related to a given centroid. To showcase 
what different BFDs look like, I created several centroids from different data, including 
an entire Word document, StegOlè, standard text, and JPG data.  Figure 2 gives a profile 
of an entire OLE2 Word document composed entirely of text and one composed only of 
images.  In the end, the type of data contained in the document does not affect the ability 
to hide or detect information. 
Figure 2 shows the average number of byte values found in the 512-byte sliding 
windows of a Word document.  It also shows a concentration of byte values around the 
19 
 
lower case alphabet ASCII values, with a spike at byte value 30 for the ASCII space 
character. There is also a smattering of upper case ASCII characters, between 65 and 90.   
 
Figure 2. Graph of byte frequency distributions for Word documents.  
 
This is expected for a Word document composed primarily of text.  An interesting 
characteristics of this centroid is the incredibly high count of byte value  0 (average of 
222 and a standard deviation of 190) and the generally lower value of all the other byte 
values.  While this is a general view of the byte distribution, it is not consistent through 
the entire document, showcased by the standard deviation for each byte value, which is 2-
4 times higher then the mean, indicating high of variance between the different windows.  
Figure 3 presents an excerpt of an existing Word file and shows a side by side 
comparison of the original document and the same document containing a covert channel.  
Note the high variability of byte values, especially in the unseen used sections of the 
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document.  This excerpt also shows how sometimes the unused section is simply filled 
with zeros. 
 When a centroid is calculated for a specific type of data, the BFD values 
normalize, and lower standard deviations emerge. As shown in Figure 4, the distribution 
for text appears as expected with a concentration around the alphabet and space ASCII 
values, while the StegOlè data and JPG data are fairly evenly distributed across all values.  
When mapping the values next to each other, I unexpectedly discovered that the binary 
distributions for the two are very similar.  
 To generate the centroid for the covert channels created by StegOlè requires 
several steps.  First, because each modified document only has two modified sectors, I 
modified multiple documents to contain hidden data.  Then, I extracted 512-byte window 
sections from those documents by using the technique to identify the covert channel 
sections (see Section 5.2).  The resulting centroid is subsequently generated by 
calculating the mean and standard deviation of those harvested windows.  See Figure 4 
for a visual representation of the StegOlè centroid.  When the BFD distance between the 
StegOlè Centroid and each sliding window in a Word document is taken, the distances 
will generally vary from the 400s for similar data to 8.38x1010 for dissimilar data.  In this 
thesis, future references to the BFD distance indicate distances between the StegOlè 
centroid and a given data set.  
 Experiments using 64-byte sliding windows did not yield any interesting data. I  
found that when windows smaller than 512 bytes are used, there just is not enough data to 
generate a distribution with any interesting characteristics.  This supports the conclusion 
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made by Kerresand et al. [14] to not use windows smaller then 512 bytes. 
 
5.5 Dead Space Properties of OLE2 
Documents   
 My original research created an algorithm to find within dead space regions of the 
OLE2 format vulnerable sections that can be overwritten without affecting the 
document’s integrity.  The development of this algorithm is based on POI File System 
(POIFS) [24], an open source, Java-based implementation of the OLE2 format.  By 
leveraging this tool, the Section Allocation Table (SAT) is read and the dead space sectors 
can be identified.  This algorithm developed independently of StegOlè, identified nearly 
all the same dead space sectors that StegOlè uses to hide data. These sectors, referred to 
as dead space, exist in every OLE2 Document that has been examined.  Analysis of 293 
randomly collected word documents (see Figure 5) show there is an average of 1699.8 
bytes (7680 bytes maximum and 368.64 bytes minimum) of dead space per file that can 
be overwritten without increasing the file size.  A significant observation is the lack of 
correlation between the size of the file and the amount of dead space in a given file. 
5.6  Similarity between 
PowerPoint and Excel 
Documents 
Further analysis of other document types using the OLE2 format, shows similar patterns 
to those in Word documents.  Figure 6 shows a comparison of the average dead space and 
number of dead space regions in a set of Word, Excel, and PowerPoint documents.  The 
Word data set is as described in Section 5.1, the Excel and PowerPoint datasets are 
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composed of 103 and 99 randomly collected documents, respectively.  Figure 6 also 
includes sample Word documents containing specific data, one only with images and the 
other containing only embedded OLE objects.  Other than PowerPoint documents which 
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Figure 3. Character data dump from original Word document (left) and altered Word 
document (right). 
|od --format=c  -Ad --width=8             || od --format=c  -Ad --width=8    | 
|   --skip-bytes=37392                    ||    --skip-bytes=37392           | 
|   --read-bytes=7024                     ||    --read-bytes=7024            | 
|   --output-duplicates                   ||    --output-duplicates          | 
|   testing_doc_109_orig.doc              ||    testing_doc_109_tampered.doc | 
| Byte  |                                 ||      Tampered Document with     | 
|Offset |     Original Document           ||       a Covert Channel          | 
 0037520       T   h   e       t   r   a  ||        T   h   e       t   r   a 
 0037528   n   s   c   r   i   p   t   i  ||    n   s   c   r   i   p   t   i 
 0037536   o   n       w   a   s       d  ||    o   n       w   a   s       d 
 0037544   o   n   e       b   y       W  ||    o   n   e       b   y       W 
 0037552   e   s   l   e   y       J   o  ||    e   s   l   e   y       J   o 
 0037560   h   n   s   t   o   n       (  ||    h   n   s   t   o   n       ( 
 0037568   w   w   j   o   h   n   s   t  ||    w   w   j   o   h   n   s   t 
 0037576   o   n   @   a   o   l   .   c  ||    o   n   @   a   o   l   .   c 
 0037584   o   m   )   .  \r  \r  \r  \0  ||    o   m   )   .  \r  \r  \r  \0 
 0037592  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  ||   \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0 
 0037600  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  ||   \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0 
 0037608  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  ||   \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0 
 0037616  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  ||   \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0 
              ......                      ||             ...... 
              ......                      ||             ...... 
 0042792  \0  \0  \0  \0 350  \0  \0  \0  ||   \0  \0  \0  \0 350  \0  \0  \0 
 0042800  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  ||   \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0 
 0042808  \0 350  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  ||   \0 350  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0 
 0042816  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0 350  \0  ||   \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0 350  \0 
 0042824  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  ||   \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0 
 0042832  \0  \0  \0 341  \0  \0  \0  \0  ||   \0  \0  \0 341  \0  \0  \0  \0 
 0042840  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  ||   \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0 
 0042848 337  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  ||  337  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0 
              ......                      ||             ...... 
              ......                      ||             ...... 
 0042944  \0  \0  \0 001 017  \0  \0 004  ||   \0  \0  \0 001 017  \0  \0 004 
 0042952  \0  \0 022   d   h 001 001  \0  ||   \0  \0 022   d   h 001 001  \0 
 0042960  \0  \a  \0  \0 003   $ 001 022  ||   \0  \a  \0  \0 003   $ 001 022 
 0042968   d   h 001 001  \0   a   $ 001  ||    d   h 001 001  \0   a   $ 001 
 0042976  \0  \b  \0  \0 021 204 320 002  ||   \0  \b  \0  \0 021 204 320 002 
 0042984 022   d   h 001 001  \0   ` 204  ||  022   d   h 001 001  \0   ` 204 
 0042992 320 002  \0 005  \0  \0  \r 306  ||  320 002  \0 005  \0  \0  \r 306 
 0043000 005  \0 001 260 023  \0  \0 026  ||  005  \0 001 260 023  \0  \0 026 
 0043008 034  \0 037 260 320   /     260  ||  034  \0 037 260 320   /     260 
 0043016 340   =   ! 260  \b  \a   " 260  ||  340   =   ! 260  \b  \a   " 260 
 0043024  \b  \a   # 220 240 005   $ 220  ||   \b  \a   # 220 240 005   $ 220 
 0043032 240 005   % 260  \0  \0  \0  \0  ||  240 005   % 260  \0  \0 265 232 
 0043040  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  ||  305 272   +   L 334 207   |   K 
 0043048  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  ||  234 371 204   + 346   F   - 274 
 0043056  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  ||  306 245 355 250 002 350 022 017 
 0043064  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  ||  001   2   j   Y 260  \r 222   9 
 0043072  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  ||    4   | 370   G 200   = 364 362 
 0043080  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  ||    ]   | 001 371 362 264 226  \b 
 0043088  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  ||  025   x 006 321 362   A 024   ( 
              ......                      ||             ...... 
              ......                      ||             ...... 
 0043496  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  ||  231   Q 030 351 225   ( 251 202 
 0043504  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  ||  336   ~   q 016 227   G 303 
 0043512  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0  ||    ]  \a   ,   # 227 222 204   a 
 0043520 024  \0 021  \0  \n  \0 001  \0  ||  024  \0 021  \0  \n  \0 001  \0 
 0043528   i  \0 017  \0 003  \0  \0  \0  ||    i  \0 017  \0 003  \0  \0  \0 
 0043536 004  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0   0  \0  ||  004  \0  \0  \0  \0  \0   0  \0 
 0043544  \0   @ 361 377 002  \0   0  \0  ||   \0   @ 361 377 002  \0   0  \0 
 0043552  \f  \0 006  \0   N  \0   o  \0  ||   \f  \0 006  \0   N  \0   o  \0 
 0043560   r  \0   m  \0   a  \0   l  \0  ||    r  \0   m  \0   a  \0   l  \0 
 0043568  \0  \0 002  \0  \0  \0 020  \0  ||   \0  \0 002  \0  \0  \0 020  \0 
 0043576   _   H 001 004   m   H  \t 004  ||    _   H 001 004   m   H  \t 004 
              ......                      ||             ...... 
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Figure 4. Byte frequency distribution for different text, StegOle covert channel and JPG. 
 
Figure 5. Available dead space (KB) in Word documents. 
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which generally contain more dead space and more dead space regions than other types 
of documents, the patterns of available dead space generally match those found in the 
larger dataset.  This additional space found in PowerPoint documents is a bonus, as it 
increases the potential payload.  Unlike a PowerPoint document, even though a Word 
document with only embedded OLE objects has more dead space and a few more dead 
space regions than typical Word documents, it still falls within the norm of Word 
documents.   Thus, collecting and enumerating this data demonstrates that each document 
type is uniquely vulnerable to containing covert channels.  While a particular document 
type or data type may result in a higher capacity for the covert channel, all will be able to 
contain hidden data that will not affect the behavior or functionality of the document 
itself. 
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Figure 6. Dead space averages for different OLE2 documents. 
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CHAPTER 6 
A BETTER WAY TO HIDE DATA  
6.1 Decreasing the Probability of 
Finding True Positives 
Changing our focus to anti-forensics, in this chapter, I describe a method of 
decreasing the ability to detect the presence of any covert channels in an OLE2 
document.  A proficient method to achieve lower true positive detection and increase the 
false positives is to encode the covert channel to be statistically similar to the existing 
document.  This not only includes picking a single target statistical value and encoding 
the covert channel to match, but includes variable statistical values similar to those found 
in the document itself.  By matching the statistical values this way, distinguishing 
between documents that actually contain covert channels and those that do not is 
extremely difficult.  Any threshold defined to detect the differences is inevitably plagued 
with large numbers of false positives, rendering the detection algorithm useless. 
6.2 Exploring OLE2 Vulnerable 
Regions  
Every OLE2 document has dead space regions (see Figure 5) that can be 
exploited to contain a covert channel.  These regions have unique properties different 
from the rest of the OLE2 document, because the data has no value to the document 
itself.   From the dataset of 293 unique documents described earlier, I extracted and 
reviewed for common statistical properties the dead space regions.  As shown in Table 3, 
the single most common data points are regions of only zeros, accounting for 39.56  
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Table 3. General Kurtosis Properties of Dead Space Regions. 
 
percent of the all the dead space regions. Unfortunately, no data can be hidden in these 
regions, so the focus turns to those containing any non-zero data. Of the 220 regions, 
there were 98 that generated unique kurtosis values (excluding outliers).  Figure 6 shows 
the distribution of the 98 different values, the majority of values being between 1 and 10 
and between 20 and 30.  Ironically, even though there are fewer dead space regions with 
kurtosis values between 20 to 30 than between 1 to 10, when all the data is considered, 
the kurtosis values between 20 to 30 account for 16.5 percent of the data points while the 
1 to 10 range accounts for a smaller 12.9 percent. Given this information, I deduce that 
maintaining kurtosis values in the 20 to 30 range will result in a covert channel with the 
lowest detectability.  By focusing on the kurtosis value it is expected and has shown 
through the experimentation that the BFD distance changes accordingly and blends into 
the statistical similarities of the document as well. 
 
 
Total Population Of Unique Values*
Dead Space Regions 365 98
Minimum 1.04 1.11
Maximum 508.94 126.01
Averge 27.22 18.18
Std. Dev. 47.94 16.26
ZERO Count 220 0
Non ZERO Values 144 98
Median 21.69 20.63
* Excludes Outliers
General Kurtosis Properties of Dead Space Regions 
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Figure 7. Graph of unique kurtosis value. 
 
6.3 Experiments with Different 
Encodings of the Payload 
The purpose of the experiments was to determine the best combination of payload 
and filler values needed to blend with the existing documents.  I took several approaches. 
The first was simply encoding the payload with a base 64 encoding, the second attempt 
was to insert data only every third byte.  In additional I tried several more experiments 
modifying the payload density until the payload was statistically similar to the 
surrounding data.  In these experiments, the measurement used to indicate the payload 
density was in bytes per 512 bytes region.  For example, if the payload is 52, there are 52 
bytes of actual data encoded in a 512 byte region, while the rest is filler data, either 0 or 
255.  
Each experiment explored how the kurtosis and BFD distance thresholds need to 
change to account for the new encoding and how detection results change.   
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Table 4 shows the expected thresholds needed to detect each of the different 
encodings.  Each successive encoding attempted to increase the kurtosis and BFD 
distance, this results in a general trend of the threshold increasing from a kurtosis 
threshold of 2.2 and BFD distance of 1400 to 38 and 165000, respectively.   A different 
set of documents was then encoded with each type of encoding, and a detection algorithm 
(see Chapter 7) with each of the different thresholds was run against those documents.  
The results for each encoding and the detection results are discussed in detail in the 
following sections.  In general, however, the experiments prove that in order to detect the 
different encodings the threshold must be raised. The drawback is that the higher the 
thresholds the more false positives are encountered.  
 
Table 4. Detection Thresholds Needed to Detect Each Encoding. 
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52 Byte Load 
w/ 255 13.31 10.65 15.99 305609 305354 306723 17 350000
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6.3.1 Base 64 Encoding Experiment 
The simplest and easiest encoding scheme to test was a base 64 encoding.  Using 
the sun.misc.Base64Encoder, I encoded and hid the payload in an OLE2 document.  The 
resulting analysis showed an increase of the average kurtosis to 4.3 and the average BFD 
distance to 2477.  Immediately these values pushed the covert channel into a range 
undetectable by the current detection algorithm.   Table 5 shows how the detection tool 
reacted to the increased variability in the new encoding.  The reference thresholds of 2.2 
and 1400 resulted in almost none of the encoded documents being detected.  However, 
when the threshold was raised to a kurtosis value of 8 and BFD distance of 4000 all the 
documents were detected.  As expected, the number of false positives increased each time 
the threshold was raised. 
 
Table 5. Detection Results for Base 64 Encoding. 
 
Used Threshold 
    
Kurtosis 
Threshold  
BFD 
Threshold 
False 
Positive 
Percent 
False 
Negative 
Percent 
2.2 1400 0.71% 97.37% 
8 4000 0.71% 0.00% 
5 80000 19.86% 0.00% 
17 350000 33.33% 0.00% 
18 145000 32.62% 0.00% 
22 155000 46.81% 0.00% 
26 160000 64.54% 0.00% 
38 165000 89.36% 0.00% 
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6.3.2 Every Third Byte Experiment 
Encoding every third byte with a payload byte was done based on multiple 
observations of such a pattern.  The scheme resulted in a 33 percent density or roughly 
168 bytes per region.  When the filler bytes were set to zero, the resulting kurtosis 
average value of 4 was similar to the Base64 Encoding; however, the BFD distance was 
significantly higher at 80000 (see  
Table 6).  The predicted threshold found 95.66 percent of the encoded documents 
(4.44 percent false negative rate).  The false positive percent also increased to 17 percent.  
Each subsequent threshold resulted in zero false negatives, but the false positive percent 
increased over the previous experiment. 
6.3.3 52-Byte Payload with Filler Bytes 
Set to 255 Experiment 
 Another pattern regularly seen is the first part of a dead space region contains 
varying values, followed by a bunch of zeros.  In my next experiment, I used filler values  
 
Table 6.  Detection Results for Every 3rd Byte Encoding. 
 
Used Threshold 
    
Kurtosis 
Threshold  
BFD 
Threshold 
False 
Positive 
Percent 
False 
Negative 
Percent 
2.2 1400 0.63% 97.04% 
8 4000 1.27% 74.81% 
5 80000 17.09% 4.44% 
17 350000 31.65% 0.00% 
18 145000 31.65% 0.00% 
22 155000 43.67% 0.00% 
26 160000 61.39% 0.00% 
38 165000 90.51% 0.00% 
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of  255 instead of zeros.  This experiment showed an average kurtosis value of 
13.31 and an average BFD distance of 305609.  This BFD distance was significantly 
higher than in any other experiment, but the kurtosis value still was not as high as was 
hoped for.  The detection results in 
Table 7 show that all the modified documents were discovered with the predicted 
thresholds.  An important observation is how the lower thresholds had high false negative 
rates (45 to 86 percent).  
6.3.4 52-Byte Payload Experiment 
Encoding the first 52 bytes of a region with data followed by 450 bytes of 0 
closely matched data patterns seen in the data.  This payload density of 10 percent had 
kurtosis values slightly higher than when using a filler of 255 with a value of 14.62, but 
the BFD distance dropped significantly, down to 143378.  With the new threshold values 
of 18 and 145000,  
 
Table 8 shows all the modified documents were detected.  It also makes sense that 
the previous threshold with a kurtosis of 17 and BFD distance of  
 
Table 7.  Detection Results for 52 Byte with 255 Filler Values Encoding. 
 
Used Threshold 
    
Kurtosis 
Threshold  
BFD 
Threshold 
False 
Positive 
Percent 
False 
Negative 
Percent 
2.2 1400 0.68% 86.90% 
8 4000 0.68% 81.38% 
5 80000 13.51% 45.52% 
17 350000 27.03% 0.00% 
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18 145000 27.03% 0.00% 
22 155000 41.89% 0.00% 
26 160000 58.78% 0.00% 
38 165000 86.49% 0.00% 
 
 
Table 8. Detection Results for 52 Byte Encoding. 
 
Used Threshold 
    
Kurtosis 
Threshold  
BFD 
Threshold 
False 
Positive 
Percent 
False 
Negative 
Percent 
2.2 1400 0.00% 95.73% 
8 4000 0.00% 82.32% 
5 80000 18.60% 73.17% 
17 350000 31.01% 0.00% 
18 145000 30.23% 0.00% 
22 155000 41.86% 0.00% 
26 160000 54.26% 0.00% 
38 165000 86.05% 0.00% 
 
350000 also found all the modified documents.  They also have similar false positive  
percents, because the kurtosis values are similar and BFD distances are so different, it 
indicates that the kurtosis threshold is the bounding value.  
6.3.5 42-Byte Payload Experiment 
This experiment was the same as the previous experiment, but I only encoded the 
first 42 bytes of the region with actual data, with filler values of zero.  This resulted in a 
kurtosis value of 18.88 and a BFD distance of 151058.  The predicted threshold in 
OleDetection with a kurtosis of 22 and BFD distance of 15500, not only correctly 
detected all the modified documents but also resulted in a jump to 40 percent of the 
documents falsely identified as containing a covert channel, as shown in  
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Table 9.  
6.3.6 32-Byte Payload Experiment  
A payload of 32 bytes per 512 byte region showed the best combination of 
kurtosis values and matched the general document statistics.  The resulting kurtosis 
values were in the 20-30 range – the kurtosis value most commonly encountered in the 
dataset.  In combination with the average BFD distance of 157621, the new thresholds in 
OleDetection were set high enough to detect all the modified documents (see  
 
 
Table 10) and incorrectly identify 54.43 percent of the remaining documents as 
containing a covert  
 
 
Table 9. Detection Results for 42 Byte Encoding. 
 
Used Threshold 
    
Th
re
sh
o
ld
 
K
u
rt
o
si
s
 
B
FD
 
Th
re
sh
o
ld
 
False 
Positive 
Percent 
False 
Negative 
Percent 
2.2 1400 1.50% 92.50% 
8 4000 1.50% 79.38% 
5 80000 12.03% 77.50% 
17 350000 25.56% 0.63% 
18 145000 25.56% 0.00% 
22 155000 39.85% 0.00% 
26 160000 54.14% 0.00% 
38 165000 88.72% 0.00% 
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Table 10. Detection Results for 32 Byte Encoding. 
 
Used Threshold 
    
Kurtosis 
Threshold  
BFD 
Threshold 
False 
Positive 
Percent 
False 
Negative 
Percent 
2.2 1400 0.63% 90.37% 
8 4000 1.27% 74.81% 
5 80000 15.19% 74.81% 
17 350000 27.22% 4.44% 
18 145000 27.22% 0.00% 
22 155000 41.77% 0.00% 
26 160000 54.43% 0.00% 
38 165000 87.34% 0.00% 
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channel.  This combination had a high enough false positive rate and a close enough 
blend to the existing document’s properties to be the most promising approach. 
6.3.7 22-Byte Payload Experiment 
Dropping the payload to 22 bytes or ~5 percent gave the highest average kurtosis 
value of 34.66 and an average BFD distance of 163672.  Table 11 shows the detection 
results with the corresponding thresholds of a kurtosis of 28 and BFD distance of 165000 
not only found all the modified documents it also incorrectly identified a whopping 89-92 
percent (see Tables 5-11) of the documents as containing a covert channel.  However, a 
drawback to this value is the uniqueness found in the kurtosis values above 30. Only 3 
percent of the overall dead space regions had kurtosis value from 30 to 40.  It should be 
noted that if this encoding is used, thresholds can be set in such a way as to detect the 
covert channels and only have a 3 percent false positive error rate. 
6.4  Experiment Conclusion 
Diluting the payload density is a careful balance between detection and actually 
being able to provide enough bandwidth as to still be usable.  Limiting the payload to 32 
bytes per 512 region is probably sufficient to avoid most detection attempts, taken a step 
further to alter regions between an “every third byte” encoding and a “32-byte payload” 
encoding would more closely blend in with the overall existing data patterns that already 
exist in the dead space regions.  
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Table 11. Detection Results for 22 Byte Encoding. 
 
Used Threshold 
    
Kurtosis 
Threshold  
BFD 
Threshold 
False 
Positive 
Percent 
False 
Negative 
Percent 
2.2 1400 0.68% 91.72% 
8 4000 0.68% 80.00% 
5 80000 14.86% 80.00% 
17 350000 25.00% 12.41% 
18 145000 23.65% 1.38% 
22 155000 39.86% 0.69% 
26 160000 56.76% 0.00% 
38 165000 91.89% 0.00% 
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CHAPTER 7 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS FOR DETECTING COVERT CHANNELS 
7.1 Experiments 
The experiments described in this chapter demonstrate the effectiveness of the 
detection algorithm.  The first publication and tool for creating covert channels in the 
dead space of OLE2 documents was in May 2007, this means the possibility of 
encountering a modified OLE2 document on the internet is very low.  However, given 
how common OLE2 documents are and the potential for a quick, widespread adoption for 
malicious use, there a significant need to create a mechanism to detect its. 
The experiments described here were run against the dataset of 293 collected 
documents (see Section 5.1), of which ~50 percent were randomly modified to hide a 
message using StegOlè.  Thus, my first task was to collect a set of OLE2 documents and 
modify a subset to contain a hidden message.  As stated previously, success is achieved 
when a high percentage of the modified documents are correctly identified with a low 
false positive rate.  The developed detection tool uses the kurtosis statistic in combination 
with the BFD to precisely identify documents that have been modified to contain a covert 
channel.  The following sections describe the experiments that led to the development of 
this tool. 
7.2 Failed First Attempt  
The initial intent was to create a general purpose detection tool that considered the 
document as a whole without taking into account any information the OLE2 format might 
provide.   The approach used a sliding window of 512 bytes and then used the BFD and 
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kurtosis statistics to identify modified sections of the document.  I quickly realized this 
approach was not feasible because the data patterns generated by StegOlè match those of 
any other binary data type, such as JPG and BMP images.  
 Statistics gathered on several different binary formats, including JPG, BMP, MP3, 
and covert channel data from StegOlè, show how the kurtosis and BFD data patterns 
overlap between the different types of data. Table 12 and 6 followed by Figure 8 and 9 
contain detailed data illustrating this pattern overlap.  The data was generated from 16 
different samples of 512 byte windows randomly taken from files of the given format, the 
kurtosis and BFD distance are then calculated and summarized. 
 The JPG and MP3 data shown in Table 12 are a close match to the StegOlè hidden 
data in Table 13.  Specifically, the difference between the average kurtosis values of 
JPG/MP3 data and the StegOlè Hidden Data average is less then 0.2.  Even though the 
minimum values are lower then the StegOlè min value, the maximum values are very 
close (within 0.05). See Figure 9.  The StegOlè BFD distance data has a narrower range, 
between 296.927 and 547.679, than the JPG or MP3 data, but the min values of the data 
ranges, 478.076 and 445.507 respectively, do not overlap. See Figure 9.   
The bitmap data (BMP) does not overlap as significantly with the StegOlè data as 
with the JPG or MP3, yet there is enough overlap for it to be misidentified.  The BMP 
kurtosis data points on average differ by 0.5. and the overall data ranges do not overlap.  
The sampling of BFD distances for the BMP here do not show an overlapping either, but 
they are still close, with roughly only a 7.1% difference between the high StegOlè BFD 
distance and the low value of the BMP distance.  Even though this sampling does not 
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Table 12.  Kurtosis Value and BFD Distance Patterns for JPG and MP3 Data. 
 
 
Table 13. Kurtosis and BFD Distance Patterns for BMP and StegOlè. 
ID Kurtosis B FD Distance Kurtosis BFD  Distance
0 1.864 557.619 1.701 724.324
1 1.880 751.896 1.819 445.507
2 1.662 859.855 1.868 515.760
3 1.836 592.729 1.838 505.495
4 1.731 608.064 1.733 551.383
5 1.880 616.000 1.782 694.210
6 1.683 874.547 1.702 637.129
7 1.788 569.273 1.849 697.657
8 1.737 524.309 1.817 809.938
9 1.749 583.262 1.835 816.192
10 1.779 524.439 1.765 578.427
11 1.729 478.076 1.816 685.461
12 1.748 604.885 1.771 760.590
13 1.818 487.540 1.800 774.252
14 1.890 508.664 1.874 532.204
15 1.707 632.147 1.812 601.904
Average 1.780 610.832 1.799 645.652
Min 1.662 478.076 1.701 445.507
Max 1.890 874.547 1.874 816.192
Std Dev 0.071 116.147 0.052 112.776
JPG (Image) Data
JPG Statistics
MP3 (Sound) Data
MP3 Statistics
ID Kurtosis BFD Distance Kurtosis BFD D istance
0 2.331 739.414 1.864 456.889
1 2.545 657.912 1.756 389.996
2 2.331 589.474 1.782 439.945
3 2.225 799.953 1.749 547.679
4 2.339 765.989 1.810 508.936
5 2.362 668.586 1.787 490.766
6 2.171 963.891 1.759 516.013
7 2.388 649.128 1.841 396.611
8 2.392 1111.846 1.872 301.004
9 2.519 629.496 1.809 296.927
10 2.480 721.579 1.814 303.970
11 2.400 656.525 1.794 394.606
12 2.332 789.442 1.872 314.663
13 2.294 649.216 1.757 300.787
14 2.445 727.427 1.794 379.075
15 2.392 672.385 1.798 465.210
Average 2.372 737.016 1.804 406.442
Min 2.171 589.474 1.749 296.927
Max 2.545 1111.846 1.872 547.679
Std Dev 0.095 129.955 0.039 83.346
Bitm ap Statistics
StegOle Hidden Data
S tegOle Statistics
Bitmap (bmp) Image Data
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Figure 8. Graph of kurtosis data patterns for MP3, BMP, StegOle, and JPG data. 
 
show an overlap in the data values, they are close enough that when they are put into 
practice, detecting the difference between the BMP and StegOle data is difficult.  
Another important detail is to have the final threshold used for the detection tool 
incorporate all of these binary types, creating many additional false positives.  
Establishing a threshold able to distinguish between general binary data and StegOlè 
covert channels requires more than can be provided with the kurtosis and BFD distance 
individually or in combination.  The additional element that enables this detection to 
work is to use the OLE2 specification to identify the sections of a document that need to 
be tested.   
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Figure 9. Graph of BFD distance patterns for MP3, BMP, StegOle, and JPG data. 
 
7.3 Detection Tool Experimental 
Results 
The ability to concentrate on specific vulnerable dead space regions allows the 
use of the kurtosis and BFD statistics to precisely identify documents that have been 
tampered with to hide data.  I developed detection algorithm that given an OLE2 
document, the dead space sectors are identified and statistics created.  The statistics are 
then compared against a threshold for the kurtosis and the BFD. If the threshold is met, 
the document is considered to contain hidden data.   
 I performed several iterations of experiments to determine the best threshold to 
use.  I tested each threshold against 11 different data sets of 293 Word files or a total of 
3223 files, Excel and PowerPoint datasets were also validated against of the final 
thresholds.  I randomly selected roughly 50% of the documents from each data set and 
modified them to contain a covert channel. Each data set hid a different amount of data in 
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its covert channel.  For example, data set one had 148 randomly picked documents 
modified by StegOlè to hide two bytes of data.  I modified each subsequent data set to 
hide increasingly more data (see Table 14).   
7.3.1 Initial Exploration of Threshold 
Values 
Based on the results of the experimentation described in Section 7.2, I targeted the 
dead space regions and calculated the statistics for each region.  The remaining question 
was the thresholds to use to indicate those documents containing a covert channel.   
 Given the data in Table 13, the first round of tests used thresholds set to a single 
standard deviation from the average.  The kurtosis value set to 1.81 and the BFD distance 
set to 490.  The results showed on average a 69.2 percent detection rate, well short of the 
desired mark.   I then set the thresholds to the max value encountered in Table 13, a 
kurtosis value of 1.87 and BFD distance of 547.  This showed an improved performance 
with an average discovery of 73.5 percent but still was not high enough. The following 
four sections describe my experiments in achieving the desired threshold. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 14. Details for Each Test Data Set. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Bytes Hidden (Bytes) 2 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 4096 Assorted
Tampered Files 148 155 148 144 131 151 133 143 137 140 147
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7.3.2 Experiment 1  
 Experiment 1 required that a WindowPrint have a kurtosis value of less than 1.99 
and a BFD distance of less than 900 in at least 50 percent of the windows. I selected this 
threshold based on visual observations made of the modified data.  The results were 
promising, with a majority of true-positive detection rates around 97 percent and no false 
positives.  The surprising exception to this was dataset 8, containing 1024 bytes of hidden 
data wherein only 88 percent of the documents were detected.  This anomaly can be 
explained by the fact that hiding 1024 bytes of data requires hiding data in two and 
sometimes three sectors.  However, not every sector is completely overwritten; in fact, 
analysis showed that only one or two of the sectors were modified enough to meet the 
threshold.  This resulted in less then 50 percent of the window prints passing the 
threshold, thus failing to be identified as containing hidden data. 
Figure 10. Graph of detection rates for unsuccessful thresholds. 
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7.3.3 Experiment 2  
Experiment 2 was a slight modification of Experiment 1 to account for the 
observations made. In fact, Experiment 2 varied from Experiment 1 only in the fact that if 
a single window had kurtosis values of less then 1.99 and BFD distances of less then 900 
it would be considered to contain hidden data.  This effectively qualified most of the 
documents that had been missed in the first experiment.  The slight change caused the 
true positive detection rate jumped 99.7 percent with a false positive rate of 0.62 percent. 
7.3.4 Experiment 3  
Experiment 3 was an attempt to get 100 percent true positive detection while still 
keeping the false positive rate low.  The thresholds were increased to 2.2 for the kurtosis 
and less than 1400 for the BFD distance.  The increased threshold provided the best result 
with an average of 99.97 percent detection rate, while the false positive rate only 
increased to 0.65 percent.  See Figure 11. 
7.3.5 Experiment 4  
Experiment 4 kept the same threshold values as Experiment 3,a kurtosis threshold 
of less then 2.2 and a BFD distance of less then 1400, but it indicated a file as having 
been modified if any single window print met either of the two thresholds – not 
necessarily both.   This resulted in 100 percent true positive identification but also an 
unacceptably high false positive rate of 65.18 percent.   
This experiment shows how the combination of statistics provides the success of 
this detection algorithm.  Taken individually, they do not provide sufficient data to 
accurately identify the difference between a modified and nonmodified file.  A summary 
46 
 
of  the thresholds used for each of the experiments is found in Table 15. 
7.3.6 Experimental Validation with Excel 
and Powerpoint Documents 
It is also important to show that the encoding and detection also works for Excel 
and Powerpoint documents.  From each dataset, I randomly selected files and modified 
them to hide data of assorted sizes. With the threshold from Experiment 3 (kurtosis of 2.2 
and BFD of 1400), I executed the detection algorithm against  the dataset to identify the 
modified documents.  For the Excel dataset, of the 109 documents, 30 were modified, and 
OleDetection correctly identified 100 percent of the modified documents while 
incorrectly identifying five false positives.  In the PowerPoint dataset, of the 99  
documents, 42 were modified with hidden data.  Of those, 38 or 90.5% were correctly 
identified with a false positive rate of 9.5%.  
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Figure 11. Graph of detection rates for the different datasets. 
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Table 15. Summary of Experiment Thresholds. 
 
The data highlights two points: first, OleDetection work for all OLE2 document 
types, and, second the threshold could be tweaked for each document type for better  
results.   Yet even so, with the results are not as flawless on these datasets as those for the 
Word dataset, the detection rate is still respectable and is in the realm of usability.  It is 
not unreasonable to point out that because each document deals with data in a slightly 
different format, when a section of the document is no longer used, it will carry with it 
characteristics of that data.  The thresholds identified here have been fine tuned for the 
Word document, the most common of the MS Office documents. With a little tweaking 
and experimentation, a higher detection rate could be achieved for these types of 
documents.  
7.3.7 Experiment Summary 
The value of any detection algorithm is its ability to have a high true positive 
detection rate and a low false positive count. A point of comparison is the detection 
algorithm developed by Kolter et al. which was able to achieve detection rates of 
unknown malicious executables at around 98 percent with a false positive rate of 0.5 
percent [15].  Using this as a reference point, Experiment 3 has great results with a 99.97 
percent positive detection rate and a 0.65 percent false positive rate.  As stated above, 
 Kurtosis Threshold Predicate BFD Threshold Required Window Count 
Experiment 1  < 1.99 AND < 900 > 50% 
Experiment 3 < 1.99 AND < 900 At least 1 Window 
Experiment 4 < 2.2 AND < 1400 At least 1 Window 
Experiment 5 < 2.2 OR < 1400 At least 1 Window 
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even though the results for the Excel and PowerPoint datasets were a bit lower, a few 
modifications of the thresholds should result in a higher detection rate.  
A different approach is to combine the detection rate and false positive into a 
single representative number that can indicate the overall value of a particular detection 
algorithm.  This value is a calculated for each dataset by taking the detection rate 
multiplied by 100 minus 2 times the percent of false positive. For example, if a given 
threshold resulted in a 95 percent detection rate with a 3 percent false positive, the value 
for that threshold would be 89.  This approach allows for a quantitative approach to 
evaluating the impact of the false positive detection of the overall algorithm.  Figure 12 
shows this combined evaluation value for each experimental threshold.  Figure 12 
highlights an already obvious conclusion, that Experiment 4 is of no real value because of 
the high false positive detection.  This approach helps distinguish between Experiments 2 
and 3 wherein the numbers are significantly closer, and the superiority of one is not 
nearly as obvious.  This approach shows that Experiment 3 has the superior threshold 
with an average value of 98.67.  The specific numbers graphed in Figure 12 are shown in 
Table 16. 
7.4 Implementation Details 
The OleDetection application is a console-based program able to identify OLE2-
formatted documents that have been tampered with to contain hidden data.  This 
implementation allows for the validation of the identified improvements in the algorithm 
improvements and the accuracy of the numbers.  The implementation can examine a 
directory full of documents or, if needed, a single file.  The approach used in  
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Figure 12. Graph of the relative value for each detection threshold. 
 
 
Table 16. Average Accuracy of Each Experiment. 
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 Experiment 4
Average True Positive 97.00% 99.71% 99.97% 100.00%
Average False Positive 0.00% 0.62% 0.65% 22.99%
Average Algorithm Value 93.82 98.81 99.29 77.01
 
 
OleDetection has a three step process for identifying OLE2 documents with hidden data.  
Step 1 digests the OLE2 document with OleSteganography and determines the dead space 
regions. Step 2 extracts the data binary data from those regions and generates the 
statistics.  Finally, Step 3 compares the calculated statistics against the predetermined 
threshold; if that threshold is met, the document is considered to contain hidden data.  
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7.4.1  OleSteganography – Finding the 
Dead Space Regions 
 Written as part of this research, OleSteganography is a library that is able to find 
the dead space regions of OLE2-formatted documents.  It is built on top of POIFS, an 
open-source Java implementation of the OLE2 file system specification [25].  To begin, 
one must remember that OLE2 is a compound file format, or rather a file containing other 
documents. The development of my method included 1820 lines of code in 17 different 
classes.  The class diagram for this is shown in Figure 14. The ability of a document to 
contain other data gives the appearance of a file system with containers, leaf data, and 
indexes to identify the location of data. OleSteganography depends on code that has been 
inserted into the POIFS code base to identify the dead space regions.  When a document 
is given to OleSteganography, it instantiates a POIFSFileSystem object which, in turn, 
creates a POIFSDocument.  The POIFSDocument is the memory representation of the 
actual OLE2 document.  To determine the contents and the different streams of data 
contained in the document, a BlockAllocationTableReader which reads the 
BlockAllocationTable (BAT) starting at offset 0x4C from the start of the document is 
instantiated.  The custom code in the BlockAllocationTableReader detects when a 
particular block is  a DeadSpaceRegion object into a list with the byte offsets to the 
region not being used (see Figure 13). Once the entire BAT has been read and all the 
Deadspace regions are identified, OleSteganography is able to retrieve the 
DeadSpaceRegion objects. 
 While this code has similarities to what StegOlè does, when it identifies convert 
channels to insert data into, it is not tied to StegOlè’s implementation.  The algorithm 
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 Figure 13. Code inserted into POIFS to gather dead space regions. 
 
//Looping through each sector of the document as identified by the BAT   
while(children.hasNext()){ 
    Object nextChild = children.next(); 
    if (!(nextChild instanceof DocumentProperty)){ 
      LOGGER.info("Error...unable to process a child of the Docuement: " + nextChild); 
      continue; 
    } 
    DocumentProperty property = (DocumentProperty) nextChild; 
    String name = property.getName(); 
    try { 
      int startBlock = property.getStartBlock(); 
      potentialDeadSpaceByDocumentName. 
                      put(name,batReader.getPotentialDeadSpaceList(startBlock)); 
      int documentSize = property.getSize(); 
      int lastByteOfDeadSpace; 
      int startByteOfDeadSpace; 
 
      //The BAT indicates if this block is used or not, if it isn’t it is  
      //susceptible to covert channels 
      if (!batReader.isValidBlock(startBlock)){ 
        startByteOfDeadSpace = startBlock * BLOCK_SIZE + documentSize; 
        lastByteOfDeadSpace = (startBlock +1)*BLOCK_SIZE-POIFSConstants.ZERO_OFFSET; 
      } else { 
        //This grabs any dead space between the end of the data and  
        //the end of the block  
        int lastBlock = batReader.getLastBlockInChain(startBlock); 
        int numberOfBlocks = batReader.getBlocksInChain(startBlock); 
        if (numberOfBlocks *BLOCK_SIZE < documentSize){ 
          System.out.println("Unable to calculate dead space for "  
                          + name + ", the report size " 
                          + documentSize  
                          + " is greater than the # of allocated blocks "  
                          + numberOfBlocks); 
          continue; 
        } 
        int lastByteOfDataOffset = (documentSize –  
                                             (BLOCK_SIZE * (numberOfBlocks - 1))); 
        if (documentSize < (BLOCK_SIZE * (numberOfBlocks - 1))) { 
          lastByteOfDataOffset = 0; 
        } 
        startByteOfDeadSpace = (HEADER_BLOCK_SIZE * BLOCK_SIZE) +  
                               (lastBlock * BLOCK_SIZE) +  
                                lastByteOfDataOffset; 
        lastByteOfDeadSpace = (HEADER_BLOCK_SIZE * BLOCK_SIZE +  
                              ((lastBlock + 1) * BLOCK_SIZE)) -  
                              POIFSConstants.ZERO_OFFSET; 
      } 
      //Add the new deadSpaceRange to a list, for later user 
      deadSpaceRanges.add( 
                     new DeadSpaceRange(startByteOfDeadSpace, lastByteOfDeadSpace)); 
    } catch(IllegalStateException e){ 
      System.out.println("Something bad happened for property " + name + " : " + e); 
    } 
  } 
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Figure 14. OleSteganography class diagram. 
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described here is a standard approach to reading OLE2 documents and identifying this 
type of covert channel.   Experiments have shown that the regions found by 
OleSteganography do not identify every region that has been modified by StegOlè; 
however, this does not hamper its ability to identify those documents that contain covert 
channels.  The point here is that even if StegOlè changes the location of the covert 
channel, this process is still be able to identify enough of the regions to detect the hidden 
data.    
7.4.2  OleDectection – Extracting Data and 
Calculating Statistics 
Once the dead space regions of the document are identified, the data needs to be 
extracted and the statistics calculated.  Refer to the class diagram of OleDetection in 
Figure 15 for a general overview of the classes used and  
Figure 16 for the critical piece of code doing the work.  The code developed for 
this portion has about 1500 lines of code in 23 different classes.   
To extract the correct regions from the document, OleDetection uses the concept 
of a WindowIterator.   The WindowIterator follows the iterator design pattern, providing 
an array of integers representing the byte value in the indicated data window for each 
item in the iteration.  The SlidingWindowIterator provides consecutive windows of data 
from a document; this is used mostly during analysis and testing.    The  
RegionWindowIterator retrieves nonconsecutive windows from a document based on a 
list of DeadSpaceRegions retrieved from OleSteganography.   
A WindowPrint encapsulates all of the data and statistics for a DeadSpaceRegion.  
The WindowPrint is created with the WindowPrint.Builder and built from the original  
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Figure 15. OleDetection class diagram. 
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Figure 16.  Code for detecting presence of covert channels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  private boolean presenceOfHiddenDataDetected(File suspectedFile) throws IOException { 
    LOGGER.debug("detecting tampered file on : " + suspectedFile); 
    if (suspectedFile == null || !suspectedFile.exists()) { 
      throw new NullPointerException( 
              "Invalid file used to detect presence of hidden data.  \n\tunmodifiedDoc=" + 
                      suspectedFile); 
    } 
    boolean result = false; 
    //Find the suceptible regions of the document to analyze 
    OleSteganography oleSteganography = new OleSteganography(new FileInputStream(suspectedFile)); 
    List<DeadSpaceRange> deadSpaceRanges = oleSteganography.getDeadSpaceRanges(); 
 
    //Provide easy access to the indicated dead regions using the WindowIterator 
    WindowIterator windowIterator = new RangeWindowIterator(suspectedFile, deadSpaceRanges); 
    int maxWindows = windowIterator.getMaxWindowsCount(); 
    ArrayList<WindowPrint> windowPrints = new ArrayList<WindowPrint>(maxWindows); 
 
    //Statistics that will be generated 
    ByteFrequencyDistribution byteFrequencyDistribution = new ByteFrequencyDistribution(); 
    final KurtosisStatistic kurtosisStatistic = new KurtosisStatistic(); 
 
    //Loop through each DeadSpace range and generate the Kurtosis and BFD 
    while (windowIterator.hasNext()) { 
      ArrayList<Integer> currentWindow = windowIterator.next(); 
      WindowPrint.Builder builder = new WindowPrint.Builder(); 
      builder.setWindowId(windowIterator.getCurrentWindowCount()); 
      builder.setWindowSize(windowIterator.getCurrentWindowSize()); 
      builder.setKurtosis(kurtosisStatistic.calculate(currentWindow)); 
      builder.setBfd(byteFrequencyDistribution.calculateDistribution(currentWindow, 
                                                                     maxDistributionValue)); 
      WindowPrint curWindowPrint = builder.create(); 
      windowPrints.add(curWindowPrint); 
      LOGGER.debug("Kurtosis Stat for window " + windowIterator.getCurrentWindowCount() 
              + " is " + curWindowPrint.getKurtosis()); 
    } 
 
    //Actually calculate if the particular regions meet the required thresholds 
    int suspectedWindowCounts = 0; 
    for (WindowPrint each : windowPrints) { 
      double bfdDistance = Centroid.STEGOLE_CENTROID.calculateDistance(each); 
      if (bfdDistance < Centroid.HIDDEN_DATA_BFD_THRESHOLD && 
              each.getKurtosis() < Centroid.HIDDEN_DATA_KURTOSIS_THRESOLD) { 
        suspectedWindowCounts++; 
      } 
    } 
    double percentWindowsSuspected = (double) suspectedWindowCounts / (double) windowPrints.size(); 
    if (suspectedWindowCounts >= 1) { 
      writer.println("Hidden Data Detected:\t " + suspectedFile); 
      result = true; 
    } 
    else { 
      writer.println("untampered file     :\t " + suspectedFile); 
      result = false; 
 
    } 
  } 
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integer array, statistics, and meta-data.  The centroid class maintains a profile for each 
type of data, as described in Section 4.4, and calculates the BFD distance between a 
known centroid and a given WindowPrint.  Each statistic is encapsulated in its own 
object and  implements either the SimpleStatistic or DistributionStatistic interface.  The 
KurtosisStatistic is a SimpleStatistic that given an array of integers, calculates the 
kurtosis value base on Formula 1 (see Section 4.3).   The BFD is generated using the 
ByteFrequencyDistribution base in Formula 2 (see Section 4.4).   
7.4.3  Threshold Comparison 
The final step in the process is to determine just how close the set of 
WindowPrints came to meeting the threshold.  Each WindowPrint’s statistics are 
compared against the individual statistic threshold. If the set of statistics are determined 
to meet the threshold, a running counter is increased.  The result is a count of 
WindowPrints representing a covert channel in the document.  The final determination as 
to whether the document as a whole has been modified is to compare this running total 
against the required number of WindowPrints.   
7.4.4 Using OleDetection 
OleDetection is a command line application not only able to detect the presence 
of covert channels, but to analyze and provide data on the documents.  Figure 17 shows 
how to interact with the application for detecting the covert channel for a single file, and 
Figure 18 is an example of how to find all tampered files in an entire directory. 
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Figure 17. Using OleDetection to test an individual file for a covert channel. 
 
 
C:\Tools\jdk\bin\java  oledetection.OleDetection -f testDoc.doc 
HIDDEN DATA DETECTED:  testDoc.doc 
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Figure 18. Detecting covert channels with OleDetection for an entire directory. 
C:\Tools\jdk\bin\java  oledetection.OleDetection -d “.\Document Repository\\” 
 
Detecting tampered files in: .\Document Repository\2 Bytes 
untampered file     :  .\Document Repository\2 Bytes\testing_doc_0.doc 
HIDDEN DATA DETECTED:  .\Document Repository\2 Bytes\testing_doc_1.doc 
untampered file     :  .\Document Repository\2 Bytes\testing_doc_10.doc 
HIDDEN DATA DETECTED:  .\Document Repository\2 Bytes\testing_doc_100.doc 
untampered file     :  .\Document Repository\2 Bytes\testing_doc_101.doc 
HIDDEN DATA DETECTED:  .\Document Repository\2 Bytes\testing_doc_102.doc 
HIDDEN DATA DETECTED:  .\Document Repository\2 Bytes\testing_doc_103.doc 
HIDDEN DATA DETECTED:  .\Document Repository\2 Bytes\testing_doc_104.doc 
untampered file     :  .\Document Repository\2 Bytes\testing_doc_105.doc 
untampered file     :  .\Document Repository\2 Bytes\testing_doc_106.doc 
untampered file     :  .\Document Repository\2 Bytes\testing_doc_107.doc 
HIDDEN DATA DETECTED:  .\Document Repository\2 Bytes\testing_doc_108.doc 
HIDDEN DATA DETECTED:  .\Document Repository\2 Bytes\testing_doc_109.doc 
HIDDEN DATA DETECTED:  .\Document Repository\2 Bytes\testing_doc_11.doc 
HIDDEN DATA DETECTED:  .\Document Repository\2 Bytes\testing_doc_110.doc 
HIDDEN DATA DETECTED:  .\Document Repository\2 Bytes\testing_doc_111.doc 
............. 
............. 
untampered file     :  .\Document Repository\2 Bytes\testing_doc_93.doc 
untampered file     :  .\Document Repository\2 Bytes\testing_doc_94.doc 
HIDDEN DATA DETECTED:  .\Document Repository\2 Bytes\testing_doc_95.doc 
HIDDEN DATA DETECTED:  .\Document Repository\2 Bytes\testing_doc_96.doc 
untampered file     :  .\Document Repository\2 Bytes\testing_doc_97.doc 
untampered file     :  .\Document Repository\2 Bytes\testing_doc_98.doc 
untampered file     :  .\Document Repository\2 Bytes\testing_doc_99.doc 
 
  
The list of tampered files are: 
testing_doc_1.doc 
testing_doc_100.doc 
testing_doc_102.doc 
testing_doc_103.doc 
testing_doc_104.doc 
testing_doc_108.doc 
testing_doc_109.doc 
testing_doc_11.doc 
testing_doc_110.doc 
testing_doc_111.doc 
..... 
testing_doc_95.doc 
testing_doc_96.doc 
 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
***** Summary ***** 
Files Examined                 : 293 
Error Count is                 : 0 
Detected Tampered file count   : 148 
......................................................................... 
The undetected files               : 
Number of Undetected Files         : 0 
......................................................................... 
The incorrectly identified as being tampered with files: 
Number of false positives          : 0 
......................................................................... 
Number of Known Tampered Files     : 148 
Number of Correctly Dectected Files: 148 
Number of Undetected Tampered Files: 0 
Number of false positives          : 0 
Correct Detection Accuracy         : 1.0 
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CHAPTER 8  
FUTURE WORK 
This work shows how covert channels can be detected and hidden in OLE2 
documents.  This work can be expanded by finding other file types with similar 
vulnerabilities and applying the principles shown here to those files.   
This thesis shows that Kurtosis and BFD have valuable properties that can be 
used to detect the presence of hidden data, but more work can be done to find other 
statistical metrics that can be used individually or in combination to detect covert 
channels or malicious ware.   These two statistical methods have shown here work well 
together. Further investigation can be done to see if other type of viruses and malicious 
programs can be detected.  The thresholds for these statistics can also be modified 
slightly to more accurately identify covert channels hidden in Excel and PowerPoint 
documents.  Another direction for future work would be adding the detection method to a 
runtime environment, such as a mail server, to detect and handle documents containing 
covert channels. 
The improved method of encoding the covert channels provides an additional 
challenge to the forensic computing community.  Further research can investigate 
methods and techniques to accurately identify documents with the improved hiding 
technique.  One possibility is to improve the OleDetection technique to detect this new 
method of encoding covert channels.  Additional methods of encoding the data in ways 
that increase entropy should also be explored.  
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    CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSION 
The anti-forensic computing community is constantly in search of more and better 
places to hide information.  The only way to stay ahead of those looking to thwart 
legitimate means of storing and transporting data is to provide better methods for 
detection and understand the extent to which data can be hidden. This work has 
succeeded on both points.  The presented detection methodology is able to detect covert 
channels inserted into the sample OLE2 documents using StegOle.  In addition, a new 
encoding approach has proven to be effective in overturning currently known detection 
algorithms. It does so by changing its statistical fingerprint to match the surrounding data. 
OleDetection is an application able to analyze and detect covert channels 
embedded into the dead or slack space of OLE2 documents.  For readers interested in a 
detailed approach to this project, the code is included in Appendix A and Appendix B.  
Using kurtosis and byte frequency distributions (BFD) statistics, with a 99.97 percent 
average true positive accuracy and with only a .65 percent false positive rate, this 
application identified those sampled Word documents modified with covert channels.  
These solid results show how statistics can be used to detect those efforts by the anti-
forensic community to covertly hide data.  
The thresholds for OleDetection were tweaked toward Word documents. As such, 
the results for detecting the covert channels in Excel and PowerPoint documents were not 
quite as good, with an average of 95 percent detection rate between the two and a false 
positive percentage of ~12 percent.  The belief is that these results will improve with a 
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larger data set and slight modifications to the thresholds to better account for the type of 
data contained in these additional OLE2 documents.  
The new encoding mechanism takes a novel approach to blend covert channels 
with the surrounding document.  Conversely, lowering the density of the payload to 
match the data being replaced results in the kurtosis, BFD, and potentially other statistical 
tools to lose some of their potency in discovering covert channels.  Specifically, the 
approach causes so many false positives to occur, that the detection algorithm is rendered 
useless.  Several experiments show that a payload density of 32 bytes per 512 bytes or ~6 
percent caused a false positive detection to rise to 27 percent, much too high to be usable 
in any sort of general application. 
The work presented here improves the field of forensics and anti-forensics by 
showing how statistical tools can be successfully used to detect covert channels and by 
showing how much more difficult it can be to detect the covert channels if they are 
encoded correctly.  
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